A Discussion of whether Turkey
[in which Kurds are the largest minority]
can or should play a role in the pacification
and rebuilding of Iraq
[which contains a predominantly Kurdish region].
Jessica Moore
The relationship between Kurds and Turkey has long been fraught with
complications. As rebuilding of Iraq is poised to begin, the question arises as
to whether Turkey should take part in the reconstruction. I
believe that Turkey is able to take a role in the peace process
in Iraq, for it would prove advantageous to both Ankara and Washington.
However, I do not think that Turkey should take a role in restructuring, for
their presence would undermine the peace process. A role for Turkey would be resented not only by the Kurds in
northern Iraq, but by the Iraqis as a whole.
The Kurds are concentrated in northern Iraq.
Though it would be incorrect to assume that the Kurds are indicative of
the Iraqi people, the Kurds do constitute a sizable minority, which accounts
for approximately twenty percent of Iraq’s population.[i] The Kurds have been marginalized for hundreds
of years, most notably after the Great Powers reneged on their guarantee in the
1920 Treaty of Sevres to establish an independent Kurdish state and in 1991
when George Bush Senior encouraged the Kurds to ‘take matters into their own
hands,’ and rebel against Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist
Party, only to withdraw from Iraq shortly thereafter.[ii] The Kurds are justified in resenting their
derogatory treatment. They were, it is
believed, the region’s original inhabitants, present in Iraq in the seventh century.[iii]
The Kurds have been ruthlessly targeted by
Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist Party. In 1975, the government in Baghdad initiated a process of “Arabization”
in northern Iraq, methodically exterminating the Kurdish
population there.[iv]
In 1988, the Anfal military campaign, led by the
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), was brutally suppressed by the Iraqi
government. Since Saddam Hussein was
removed from power early this year, 263 suspected mass graves from the Anfal campaign have been discovered, containing hundreds of
thousands of Kurdish bodies.[v]
The Kurds, however, have managed to attain a
degree of autonomy in Iraq.
After the Gulf War, a Kurdish region, called Kurdistan, was established, that stretches from the
Iranian border to the Syrian border.[vi] The area is populated by 3.5 million Kurds
and is protected by a no-fly zone, which America and Britain maintain from the Turkish air force base Incirlik.[vii] However, Kurdish political power is limited
by the fact that the population is factionalized by rivaling political
parties. The split is between the
Iranian supported, Suleimaniyah-based Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabani,
and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), founded in 1946 by Mustafa Barzani and based in Salaheddin.[viii] However, the two parties have attempted to
present a united front in order to increase Kurdish influence, promote economic
development and to bolster Kurdish appeal to their American allies.[ix] The two parties met in October 2002 for the
premier session of the Kurdish parliament.
They agreed that federalism is the only viable solution for the future
stability of Iraq.[x] The Kurds would doubtlessly benefit from this
arrangement, for they would be able to preserve the partial autonomy that they
now enjoy. Indeed, the PUK’s Berham Saleh
asserts that “Federalism is the only solution.”[xi]
However, the democracy that the Iraqi Kurds
seek is vehemently opposed by Turkey. Turkey’s concerns are correlated to the fact that
the Kurds, numbering twenty four to twenty seven million people, half of whom
are in Turkey, are the largest ethnic group without a
state.[xii] Though the Iraqi Kurds deny plans to
establish a sovereign Kurdish state, Turkey still fears that if Iraqi Kurds become
independent, then Turkish Kurds will seek to achieve similar recognition. Turkey worries that separatist yearnings will be
awakened, not only in the Turkish Kurds, but in Kurds throughout the Middle East.[xiii] Ankara further alienated the Iraqi Kurds late last
year. The Turkish Defense Minister, Sabahattin Cakmakoglu asserted
that Turkey had a “historic responsibility” for
northern Iraq, given the fact that the oil-rich cities of
Mosul and Kirkuk were initially part of the Turkish Republic, as defined by the founder of democracy in Turkey, Kemal Ataturk.[xiv]
Additionally, Turkey is resistant to the Iraqi Kurds because the
Turks are fearful of a reoccurrence of the events that took place after the
Gulf War. Following the 1991 war, 5,000
Iraqi refugees steamed into Turkey.[xv] Turkey was ill-prepared for the influx, and
received little foreign aid.
Consequently, countless Iraqis perished in the inhospitable mountain
climate of the Iraqi-Turkish border.[xvi] However, in order to prevent a repeat of
1991, Turkey has obtained permission from the United States to set up refugee camps in northern Iraq. Turkey, in cooperation with the United Nations,
began sending food and relief materials to Kurdish Iraq in March.[xvii] Also in March, KDP leader Mesut
Barzani instructed Iraqi Kurds fleeing from their
homes not to cross the Turkish border.[xviii] Therefore, it is unlikely that Turkey will witness a repeat of the events of
1991.
Turkey is also opposed to Iraqi Kurdish efforts to
maintain limited autonomy because of Turkey’s difficulties in suppressing the Turkish
Kurd terrorist organization, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The PKK and Turkish forces have been
embroiled in a separatist battle for over a decade in southeast Turkey, the area that borders Iraqi
Kurdistan. The conflict has resulted in
over 30,000 deaths, predominately Kurdish.[xix] Turkey argues that the PKK has recently
experienced a resurgence because of their link to the Iraqi Turks. Northern Iraq
has provided a haven for the PKK, and some argue that the fighting is likely to
continue as long as the PKK has this refuge.[xx]
Turkey’s difficulty with the PKK has financial
ramifications as well. The financially
weak state currently spends between six and eight billion dollars a year in an
attempt to curtail the PKK conflict in Turkey and northern Iraq.[xxi]Though the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 led to a considerable reduction in the scale
of the conflict, the PKK continues to threaten Turkish solidarity by violently
advocating for an independent Turkish state.[xxii]
Turkish financial resources have been
threatened as the state makes a concerted effort to eliminate the threat of an
independent Kurdish state. The Turkish
Kurds are draining on Turkish resources.
The southeast, which the Kurds inhabit, is the country’s most
financially unstable. Though Turkey commits the greatest domestic financial
resources to the southeast, per capita income is the lowest, unemployment in
the highest, and agricultural production is the weakest.[xxiii] Turkey has also suffered from the United Nations
imposed trade sanctions against Iraq, previously one of Turkey’s most profitable trading partners.[xxiv] Additionally, Turkey’s refusal to accept American financial aid
in exchange for assistance with the war in Iraq has led to a financial crisis in Turkey. On
March 21, the Turkish lira reached an all-time low, closing at 1,723,000 lira
to one American dollar.[xxv]
Economically, Turkey is weary of the Kurds’ attempts to seize
the city of Kirkuk. Kirkuk, under Ba’athist
control before the war, has hundreds of oil wells and ten billion barrels of
oil reserves.[xxvi] Control of Kirkuk would inevitably garner economic freedom
for the country that controlled it. The
Kurds maintain that Kirkuk is their homeland, the epicenter of their
culture and history.[xxvii] The Turks also claim Kirkuk, asserting that the city was originally
part of the Turkish Republic. Additionally, because of the destruction
incurred as a result of PKK insurrections, tourism in Turkey has plummeted, causing damage to an already
failing economy.
Turkey, because of the various problems it is
facing, has much to gain from intervening in the peace process in Iraq.
Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan
has recently taken an ingratiating stance towards America, realizing the benefits Turkey could reap as a result of the
alliance. As part of an agreement made
with America, in exchange for peacekeeping troops to
patrol the predominantly Sunni-populated central Iraq, America would agree to rid Turkey of the PKK threat.[xxviii] Turkey anticipated America disarming and deporting over five thousand
Turkish Kurd rebels from northern Iraq.[xxix] This agreement would be bolstered by the fact
that the PKK is considered a terrorist organization, and President George W.
Bush has pledged to decimate all terrorist organizations in Iraq, including the PKK.
In dire need of international support, the United States has further offered the economically weak Turkey an $8.5 billion grant in exchange for the
peacekeeping troops.[xxx] America also guaranteed Turkey that the oil of Kirkuk would be controlled by American forces.[xxxi] Additionally, Erdogan
hopes that by intervening in the Iraqi peace process, he will endorse Turkey as a key player in the Middle East. As
a prominent figure in the peace process, Erdogan
feels that Turkey would be able to prevent the separatist
leanings of the Iraqi Kurds from manifesting into an independent Kurdish state.[xxxii]
Similarly, the United States would greatly benefit from a substantial
Turkish role in the peace process. In
1997, United States President Clinton commended Turkey for their decades-long alliance with America, and extolled Turkey’s role in “contain[ing]
Iraq and Iran.”[xxxiii] As the second largest military force in NATO
after the United
States,
Turkey would prove a formidable ally. With NATO and the UN providing noncommittal
financial and military support for the war and peacekeeping process, the United States is in desperate need of international
support. With wartime spending reaching
record highs, Washington sought out allied nations to provide
peacekeeping troops in Iraq. America courted four countries, Turkey, Pakistan, India, and South Korea, to furnish 10,000 troops to replace the
101st Airborne Division in Iraq.[xxxiv]
However, prospects for extended Pakistani,
Indian and Korean aid all appeared bleak, leading the United States to depend on Turkey to provide support. Turkey is also intimately acquainted with the
terrain of Iraq, making them an even more advantageous
ally.[xxxv]
The United
States
is further relying on Turkish involvement because of Turkey’s unique role as the only Muslim nation
within NATO. Turkey’s role in the rebuilding of Iraq would therefore silence criticism that
Iraqi occupation is a Christian motivated endeavor.[xxxvi]
Though it appears advantageous for Turkey to play a substantial role in the peace
process in Iraq, it would in fact prove detrimental to the
integrity of the new government.
Turkey has proven unreliable before. Their aid is therefore not to be depended
on. On March 1, 2003, Turkey severed their once strong ties with America by refusing to allow American troops to be
deployed from Turkey. America hoped to utilize Turkey as a launch pad for 62,000 American
troops. Though Turkey did agree to let America use their airspace, Turkey remained stoic in regard to providing a
military land base for American troops, despite American offers of a $6 billion
aid package.[xxxvii]
Furthermore, threatened by the prospect of
Kurdish sovereignty, Turkey sent an advanced force of 1,500 soldiers into
northern Iraq on March 21, 2003.
40,000 additional troops were said to be poised at the Iraqi-Turkish
border.[xxxviii] By acting independently, Turkey created the possibility of extended
regional fighting, thus undermining America’s aim of establishing a democracy in Iraq.
Donald Rumsfeld, the United States’ Defense Secretary made America’s position on the Turkish occupation of
northern Iraq clear.
He warned Turkey that “it would be notably unhelpful if they
went into the north in large numbers.”[xxxix] Criticism from both the US and the United Nations has thus far proven
successful at keeping the Turkish forces at bay.[xl]
The Iraqi Kurds detest the Turks, who have
intervened repeatedly in northern Iraq. The
Turks’ ‘peacekeeping’ efforts in northern Iraq in July 2003 were viewed with deep
suspicion from the Kurds, who accused the Turks of ‘deliberately stirring the
pot.’[xli] In August 2003, Adel Murad,
head of the political office of the PUK refused to allow Turkish peacekeepers
to pass through northern Iraq in order to reach their assigned post in Falluja.[xlii]
The vote in Turkey’s Parliament in early October to send
10,000 peacekeeping troops to Iraq set off a firestorm of protests. Turkish flags were burned in the
streets. The culmination of the protest
occurred in mid-October. The Turkish
Embassy in Baghdad was the target of a car bomb on October
14, 2003,
presumably in retaliation for the undesired Turkish presence in Iraq.[xliii] Protests continued until November when Turkey and the United States jointly decided not to deploy the Turkish
peacekeeping troops, citing that Turkish troops may undermine the process of
reconstruction.
Not only are the Turks despised by the Iraqi
Kurds, but the conglomerate of the Iraqi people question Turkey’s motives in rebuilding Iraq. Fawzi Shafi Ifan,
the mayor of Falluja, asserted that Turkish troops in
his city would be viewed as ‘punishment’ from America.[xliv] Ifan believes that Turkey would ‘find an occasion to revive its old
projects and interfere in Iraq’s internal affairs.’[xlv] Necirvan Barzani, prime minister of the Kurdistan regional government, echoed Ifan’s sentiment. He
stressed that not only would a Turkish force alienate the pro-American Kurds in
the north, but that the Sunni and Shia Arab
populations in central and southern Iraq would oppose the presence as well.[xlvi]
Turkey, during the time of the Ottoman Empire, ruled parts of Iraq, and has openly stated that Turkey has a ‘historical responsibility’ for
northern Iraq.
Turkey is unable to provide a model for democracy
in Iraq, for their government is largely a shadow
government, directed by the Turkish military.
Turkey became involved in the war in Iraq, though it was hugely unpopular with the
Turkish people, primarily because the Turkish generals favored war.[xlvii] Even at the Turkish Republic’s conception, instead of embracing
democratic principles, the new government simply replicated the authoritarian
Ottoman state tradition.[xlviii] Furthermore, Turkey openly opposes the establishment of a
democracy in Iraq. An
Iraqi democracy could lead to the autonomy of Kurdistan, which would incite the Turkish Kurds to
also demand sovereignty.[xlix]
The Turks claim to have a homogenous Turkish
population. By ignoring the Kurds’
ethnic differences, the Turks are exhibiting their inability to acknowledge
diversity. The approximately twelve
million ethnic Kurds who live in Turkey were denied basic human rights for many
years.[l] Until October 1995, even a mention of the
‘Kurdish problem’ in Turkey warranted a legal repercussion.[li] Turkey’s brutal treatment of the Kurds is said to
rival the atrocities committed against the Kurds by Saddam Hussein.[lii] Numerous publications refer to the ‘flood of
human rights violations occurring in [Turkey].”[liii] However, Iraq has sizable Kurd and Sunni minorities. Both of these minorities are to play a
significant role in the new government, and the nations directing the peace
process should be receptive to the contributions of these minorities to the
government. Based on the inhumane treatment
of Kurds in Turkey, it is unlikely that Turkey would acknowledge the political presence of
the Kurds in Iraq.
The establishment of a democracy in Iraq promises to be long process, for Iraqi
citizens have been socialized by Saddam Hussein’s regime, and years of
suppression have stifled the growth of a middle class. To facilitate this difficult transition, it
is instrumental for the nations involved in the peace process to have gained
the respect of Iraqi people, to have legitimate experience with democracy, and
to be knowledgeable of the diverse ethnic populations within Iraq. Turkey does not meet any of these
qualifications. Though it seems
beneficial for Turkey to be intimately involved in the peace
process, it would actually prove disadvantageous to the establishment of a
legitimate democracy in Iraq.
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[ii] Cohen, Nick.
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September 2002: 28
[iii] Goldberg, Jeffrey. “Wartime Friendships.” The New
Yorker. 14
April 2003:
30
[iv] Schechter,
Erik. “Kurds Educate Next Generation for
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November 2003.
[v] Paddock, Richard. “An Awful Truth Sinks In.” The Los Angeles Times. 5
December 2003:
A1.
[vi] Kutschera,
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[viii] Moaveni, Azadeh. “United They
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December 2003:
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